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“I Will Continue to Make the Best Defense I Can”:
Edward Bates and the
Battle over the Missouri Constitution of 1865




first in Jefferson City 
in early 1861, then 
in March in St. Louis. 
The Convention voted 
overwhelmingly—98 
to1—against 
seceding from the 
union, despite the 




Jackson and other 
state officials 
fled the state, the 
convention declared 
the offices vacant 
and appointed 
provisional officers 
who governed the 
state until almost 
the end of the war. 
(Image: Missouri 
State Archives)
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 In December 1864, as the Civil War neared its 
conclusion, radical members of the Missouri state 
Republican Party capitalized on their high regard with the 
electorate to pass a referendum for the reconvening of the 
state constitutional convention. While the stated purpose 
of this meeting was to pass an amendment mirroring 
the proposed federal Thirteenth Amendment then being 
debated in the United States House of Representatives, 
radical members of the Republican Party also proposed 
a less-celebrated cause than emancipation—changing 
the constitution to disenfranchise and punish all persons 
suspected of sympathizing with the ongoing rebellion. 
In the midst of this politically charged atmosphere 
stepped Edward Bates, recently returned to St. Louis 
after resigning his post as attorney general in the cabinet 
of President Abraham Lincoln. Having defended the 
administration’s most controversial policies (from the 
president’s suspension of Habeas Corpus in 1861 to the 
Emancipation Proclamation in 1863), and having watched 
the other conservative members of Lincoln’s cabinet 
such as Postmaster General Montgomery Blair leave 
only to be replaced by (as Bates called them) “extreme 
Radicals,”1 the 71-year-old Bates now decided that he 
should address his family’s concerns regarding his fragile 
health and forsake public life for good and all. After all, he 
reassured himself, with Lincoln re-elected, the Union was 
undoubtedly secure, and Bates could retire knowing that 
he had done all in his power to save the nation he so loved. 
It was time to let a younger generation take the reins of 
power. Events in Missouri, however, would not allow him 
to rest just yet.
 Bates found his hometown absorbed by chatter 
surrounding the imminent convening of the convention 
at the Mercantile Library. Over the next few months, as it 
became clear that the radicals intended to overstep their 
mandate from the public and instead write an entirely 
new constitution, conservative-leaning citizens expressed 
their skepticism at the legality of the convention. While 
he intended to simply watch these proceedings from the 
sidelines, Bates privately expressed the same reservations 
as his conservative neighbors, fearing the possible radical 
alteration of the governing institutions of his home 
state—a government he had personally helped to frame in 
1820. Ultimately, these events compelled him to re-enter 
the public arena, and in what may have been a greater 
political battle than any he had fought while attorney 
general, in a newspaper editorial war with Charles Daniel 
Drake—the leading radical Republican in the state—Bates 
worked tirelessly to articulate the values of conservative 
opponents to the maneuverings of the radicals. Curiously, 
although Missouri was never “reconstructed,” since it 
had not officially seceded from the Union in 1861, in 
many ways the debate between Bates and Drake mirrored 
that occurring at the national level over the course of 
Reconstruction.2
 During the war, issues such as emancipation and federal-
over-state control of the military electrified Missouri 
politics. In the state legislature, the ideological divide 
over these issues manifested in three clearly identifiable 
factions. Radical Republicans, for one, advocated 
immediate emancipation of all slaves and supported 
the control by federal officials (generally military 
commanders) of the court system as well as all military 
aspects of the war. Conservative Republicans alternatively 
supported a more gradual process of emancipation, the 
maintenance of a divide between civilian and military 
affairs, and the management of military affairs by the state 
militia under the command of the governor. And lastly, 
the Democrats opposed both emancipation and the war 
on almost equal terms. Of these three, the two factions 
of the Republican Party vied for superiority in the state 
legislature, and their inability to compromise largely 
accounted for Missouri’s sluggishness in tackling the 
issues of slavery and the guerilla war in the west.
 Out of the stalemate between these two factions 
stepped St. Louis attorney Charles Daniel Drake. As 
one biographer described him, “seldom, if ever, has a 
Missouri politician been hated so intensely by so many 
Edward Bates (1793-1869) was an early member of a 
long line of political leaders in Missouri. When he arrived 
in Missouri Territory in 1814, his older brother James had 
already been in St. Louis for a decade, serving as secretary 
to territorial governor Meriwether Lewis. When Abraham 
Lincoln appointed him Attorney General, he became the 
first cabinet member from west of the Mississippi. (Image: 
Library of Congress)
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Missourians.”3 Yet this assessment reflects the hindsight 
of Missourians years after Drake’s political career had 
ended. Fifty-four years old in 1865, he was in his prime. 
Originally from Ohio, Drake had piloted a life of twists 
and turns in economic and political fortunes. Nearly 
bankrupted during the Panic of 1837, he rose by the 1850s 
to great prominence as the founder of the St. Louis Law 
Library and as an advocate for the implementation of 
a citywide public school system. A supporter of Henry 
Clay and Zachary Taylor in the presidential contests of 
1844 and 1848 respectively, by 1859 he had moved to the 
Democratic Party, which elected him to the Missouri state 
assembly later that year. In the assembly, Drake’s belief in 
his own self-importance won him few friends among his 
colleagues. Furthermore, his support of such initiatives as 
Sunday Blue Laws and his castigation of German voters as 
Sabbath-breakers for their opposition to said laws, earned 
him few converts among St. Louis voters. Consequently, 
he did not stand for reelection in 1860.4 
 Drake did not stay out of politics for very long. 
Decidedly pro-slavery during the first year of the war, 
once he sensed that the political atmosphere in Missouri 
was fast turning against the institution Drake defected 
to the radical Republicans in the winter of 1862. With 
the success of anti-slavery pro-Union men in the 
state elections that year and having been elected as a 
replacement delegate to the Missouri Constitutional 
Convention of 1863, he subsequently began advocating for 
immediate emancipation. When that convention eventually 
implemented a gradual process of emancipation, he rose to 
the rank of leader of the radical element of the Republicans 
by organizing a separate meeting in Jefferson City in 
September calling for immediate emancipation.5
 By November 1863, Missouri’s “loyal citizens”—
As an experienced lawyer, Charles Daniel Drake (1811-
1892) was a Radical Republican by the end of the Civil 
War. The Missouri constitution crafted at its convention 
in early 1865 reflected the future Radical agenda 
nationally—an immediate end to slavery, restricted rights 
for Confederate sympathizers, a ban on compensating 
slave owners for their losses on human “property,” and 
an “Ironclad” oath of allegiance to the union. It also 
created free public schools state-wide. The so-called “Drake 
Constitution” was replaced by a new one in 1875. (Image: 
Library of Congress)
Henry Clay’s American System advocating a limited 
executive coupled with a more activist role of government 
in advancing the national economy was central to Whig 
ideology from the 1820s until the death of the Whig Party 
after the 1852 presidential election. Edward Bates—like 
Abraham Lincoln—carried those Whig notions about 
the role of government, as well as its limitations, into his 
involvement in the newly formed Republican Party. (Image: 
Library of Congress)
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those on record as having taken an oath of loyalty to the 
Union—overwhelmingly favored the radical persuasion, 
giving them a three-thousand-vote lead in the state 
elections. By the time the legislature convened in early 
1864, then, they had enough votes to successfully call a 
referendum for a new state convention with the intention 
of amending the state constitution, and thus immediately 
ending slavery and disenfranchising any and all disloyal 
persons. To that end, the following November—a full year 
after the radicals first won control of the legislature—
Missouri voters overwhelmingly approved the referendum, 
and three-fourths of their chosen delegates to the new 
convention were of the radical persuasion. Nonetheless, 
as William Parrish noted, their election was a hollow 
victory in that they owed it to both Abraham Lincoln’s 
landslide victory in the presidential contest as well as 
the disfranchisement of Missouri Democrats who failed 
to prove their allegiance to the Union. Still, the radicals 
insisted on interpreting their victory as yet another triumph 
for the advocates of emancipation, as well as union over 
rebellion.6
 Having returned to St. Louis on the eve of the 
convention’s assembly, Bates initially confined his 
observations of the radicals’ maneuvers solely to the pages 
of his diary. Although he had sometimes compromised 
his political affiliation—he had started public life as a 
National Republican, then became a Whig, and even flirted 
with the Know-Nothing Party of the mid-1850s before 
reluctantly joining the Republican coalition in 1860—all 
of his life, he had been a principled statesman. Unlike 
Drake, Bates’s deep-rooted political values hardly, if ever, 
changed. It was, instead, the parties that moved away from 
him. And these uncompromising principles now led him to 
read chicanery in the actions of the radicals. 
 Born in Virginia in 1793, Bates took the advice of 
his older brother Frederick—the secretary and recorder 
of deeds for the Louisiana Territory, and later second 
governor of Missouri—and came to the village of St. Louis 
following a short military service in the War of 1812. From 
1814 to 1860, he—like Drake—developed a lucrative 
public career in his new hometown. However, in contrast 
to his younger adversary, Bates fostered his political 
values early and maintained them with little variation 
throughout his entire life. Furthermore, his particular 
values and public service were instrumental during the first 
days of the Missouri state government. 
 Taking advantage of Frederick’s high status and his 
contact with prominent citizens like the Chouteaus, 
Edward developed his own professional connections and 
eventually convinced prominent St. Louis lawyer Rufus 
Easton to let him study law in his office. A few years 
later—through the course of his work prosecuting land 
cases for prominent French creole St. Louisans—he caught 
the attention of Territorial Governor William Clark, who 
nominated him as circuit attorney for St. Charles, St. 
Louis, and Washington counties. The prominence of that 
position, along with his connections to high society, made 
him a natural choice for public office, and he thus entered 
the arena during the crusade for Missouri statehood. 
 Publicly opposing the maneuverings of New 
York Congressman James Talmadge to mandate the 
emancipation of all Missouri slaves over the age of 
Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet, seen here, included three of his adversaries for the Republican presidential nomination in 1860: 
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase of Ohio (second from left), Secretary of State William Seward of New York (seated 
in profile facing Lincoln), and Attorney General Edward Bates of Missouri (far right). (Image: Library of Congress)
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21, and similarly opposed to Illinois Senator Jesse B. 
Thomas’s amendment banning slavery in all of the 
Louisiana Territory north of the 36th parallel, Bates instead 
believed that the only provision that must be adhered 
to in the formation of a state was the requirement, in 
Article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution, 
that the state establish a republican government. He thus 
became a candidate to represent his home district as a 
strict constructionist and anti-restrictionist in the state 
constitutional convention of 1820, where he made his 
most lasting contribution by serving on the Judiciary 
Committee and drafting the preamble to the constitution. 
When the convention adjourned on July 19, 1820, his 
accomplishments had so enhanced his reputation that 
Missouri’s first governor, Alexander McNair, named him 
to be the state’s first attorney general.7
 From the 1820s through the 1840s, Bates served in both 
the Missouri assembly and U.S. congress, and he became 
an influential figure in the national Whig Party. Indeed, 
by the time of his retirement from the Missouri Senate 
in 1835, his friends had come to see him as a potential 
leader against Democratic ideals. Another Whig candidate, 
though, was always chosen by the national party in Bates’ 
stead. Likewise, Bates turned down several offers for 
patronage offices by Whig presidents, putting the needs 
of his ever-expanding family before his own political 
ambitions. Still, his editorials in the St. Louis newspapers 
and his position as president of the River and Harbor 
Convention in 1847, indicate his importance in articulating 
the Whig message to American voters.8
 As the Whig party collapsed from sectional divisions in 
the mid-1850s, Bates refused to compromise his principles 
in order to court the new northern political coalitions. 
Instead, he hoped those coalitions (mainly comprising 
anti-slavery, pro-union men) could be convinced to adopt 
his personal views on the numerous issues facing the 
nation. This hope ultimately led to his failed attempt to 
win the Republican nomination for president in 1860 and 
fueled his efforts to advocate a conservative agenda on 
public policies from within the Lincoln Administration. 
However, as the president and his closest advisers 
more and more supported a moderate-to-radical stance 
on emancipation, black citizenship, central banking, 
and reconstruction, Bates’s unfailing conservatism led 
him to conclude that he had become irrelevant to the 
administration. This realization, more than his stated 
health concerns, may have been the real reason behind 
his resignation in 1864. At any rate, unlike his younger 
adversary Drake, Bates did not conform to the times, and 
was thus increasingly left behind by younger generations 
of politicians.9
 On December 20, 1864, Bates ruminated on terms 
such as “radical,” “loyalty,” and “convention”—all being 
tossed around in private conversations. “Radical,” he 
observed, was defined as “adhesion to my clique.” But 
he fashioned his own definition of a “radical politician,” 
suggesting facetiously that, “the good of the people is the 
Supreme Law, and he is the only judge of what is good 
for the People!” Comparing them to the secessionists of 
1860, Bates saw the radicals as a small band of fanatics 
who had managed to assume control of the government by 
professing their love of personal liberty while, in actuality, 
suppressing any and all political dissent. As for their call 
for a new state convention, Bates further commented that a 
“convention” was defined as “a gathering of Demagogues, 
designed to throw society into anarchy, and then to gamble 
for a better system.” The late referendum, he believed, was 
simply a method by which radicals worked to solidify their 
power. This examination later became central to his public 
crusade against them.10
 For the time being, these ruminations were his only 
mention of the imminent convention. However, it is 
evident from this short passage that Bates viewed the 
radicals with some measure of disdain. This is partially 
explained by that faction’s treatment of his late brother-
in-law, Hamilton R. Gamble (the earlier wartime governor 
of Missouri). Angered by the governor’s slow approach to 
emancipation and his reluctance to centralize power in the 
hands of the military, several radical Missouri Republicans 
(including Drake) began publicly haranguing Gamble and 
Hamilton Rowan Gamble (1798-1864) was provisional 
governor of Missouri under the pro-Union government. 
Gamble came from a legal background, and was chief 
justice of the Missouri Supreme Court in 1852—he was the 
dissenter when the court overturned the “once free always 
free” doctrine in the Dred Scott case. (Image: Special 
Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library)
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actively lobbied the president for his removal from office.11 
At one moment in December 1863 Bates wrote in his diary 
of a particularly vile speech given by Missouri legislator 
Sempronius H. Boyd against the governor at a meeting 
of the Union League (a political interest group devoted 
to radical causes and now active in 18 northern states), 
stating that Boyd’s comments were laced with “vulgar 
ignorance, for which, if I had time, I would trounce them 
soundly.”12 And when, in February 1864, Bates learned of 
Gamble’s unexpected death, he wasted no time in placing 
the blame for his brother-in-law’s demise squarely on the 
shoulders of the radicals. For instance, while reviewing 
the report of the Missouri Republican on the expressions 
of grief made at the February 4 meeting of the Missouri 
Bar Association, Bates noted the absence of Drake’s name 
from any part of the proceedings. “I am a little curious 
about the motive of his absence,” wrote Bates. “Whether 
he [stayed] away, because he could not, conscientiously 
join in honoring to so bad a man as Gamble; or was he 
frowned away, by those who thought him unworthy to 
mingle, on a solemn occasion, with Gamble’s friends!”13
 Clearly, then, Bates had no respect for the radicals. But 
he nonetheless remained relatively silent—publicly—
about their maneuvers regarding the convention, because 
of a decision on his part to wait and see whether his 
suspicions about their motives would prove true. He did 
not have to wait long. Once the convention set about the 
work for which it had been called, Bates became more 
vocal in the debate over the future of civil rights and 
minority representation in Missouri.
 January, 7 1865, marked the convention’s first full day, 
and its members wasted no time in addressing the issues 
for which they had assembled. In a mere four days, for 
instance, the delegates passed an ordinance immediately 
abolishing slavery in Missouri. Arnold Krekel and Charles 
Drake signed the ordinance in their respective capacities 
as president and vice president of the convention. Sixty-
two other delegates also lent their names to the measure 
and, the following day, Governor Thomas Fletcher gave 
his endorsement by declaring the ordinance the law of the 
land.14 
 The emancipation ordinance prompted Bates’s first entry 
in his diary for the year, and also provided his first major 
criticism of the convention. On January 12, he confessed 
that he found the emancipation ordinance wholly 
unnecessary. The convention of 1863, he remarked, had 
already adopted a sufficient plan for gradual emancipation 
over a period of seven years. Only wait another five years 
and slavery would cease to be a problem. Since the only 
difference between the two plans was the immediacy of the 
1865 ordinance, Bates again surmised that emancipation 
was merely the means of calling the convention into 
being, and not its true goal. If, alternately, emancipation 
was the true goal of the convention, he observed, there 
would have been no need for its assembling in the first 
place. Furthermore, having passed the 1865 ordinance, the 
convention had no further business to attend to, and should 
thus adjourn. Instead, he surmised, the radicals would 
surely use the emancipation ordinance as a springboard for 
embarking on their true course to secure “the ascendancy 
and permanency” of their faction.15 
 Indeed, as Bates expected, the radicals soon announced 
that their next order of business was the nullification of 
the old constitution and the creation of a new document. 
Afterward, so the rumors went, they planned to introduce 
an ordinance removing all non-radicals from public 
office. Having been called, therefore, “ostensibly to 
enfranchise the slaves and punish rebels,” Bates lamented, 
the radicals “assume to remodel the State and dispose 
of all its interests. They do not condescend to amend the 
constitution, but assume to make a new one.”16 The fact 
that perhaps rankled Bates more than any other was that he 
had been influential in forging the very document that the 
radicals now sought to overturn. Along with his criticism 
of their suppression of all political opposition, replacing 
the old constitution with a new document thus formed the 
Part of the work of the Constitutional Convention was 
banning slavery in the state in early 1865, almost a year 
before the Thirteenth Amendment in late 1865, ending 
slavery nationally. (Image: Missouri State Archives)
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second pillar of Bates’s battle against the radicals.
 By January, several of Bates’ friends, realizing that 
he had lived through some of the most interesting years 
in American history, began to urge him to make some 
contribution to history by writing a memoir of his personal 
experiences in the most pivotal events of the past 70-odd 
years. For some time, he had actually been considering 
such a project, but he ultimately dismissed it because 
he distrusted his ability to recount the past objectively. 
Instead, he believed himself far more suited “to state a 
principle, in accurate terms, and maintain it by logical 
argument, and to pass judgment upon a man or measure, 
and support it with such power as the facts of the case and 
the principles involved in it, may warrant.”17 Long ago 
he had decided upon the occupation of attorney; he now 
believed himself best suited to contribute to society by 
using his particular skills as a jurist to prosecute what he 
believed to be gross disservices to his fellow Missourians. 
Having thus made the decision to lend his voice publicly 
to the perceived radical violations to law and order, it was 
evident from the amount of space allotted in his diary to 
the happenings in the convention that the new constitution 
would be the target of his prosecution. The only question 
remaining then was, what newspaper should provide the 
vehicle of that prosecution? Only a local newspaper bold 
enough to oppose the convention’s extralegal measures 
without fear of repercussion would suffice. However, 
he observed, bold criticism from the press seemed to be 
lacking these days. Certainly, the newspaper editors would 
eventually realize the extent of the radicals’ wrongdoings, 
but until then Bates feared that his essays would be 
shunned by a cowardly press. In the end, Bates concluded 
that he could not wait for the editors to find their courage 
for a series of exchanges published in the papers between 
Governor Thomas Fletcher and Major General John C. 
Pope, commander of Union forces in St. Louis, over 
whether or not to continue the use of martial law in the 
state forced Bates to act sooner than later.18
 On February 20, President Lincoln wrote to Fletcher 
with some suggestions for hastening an end to hostilities 
in Missouri. Despite a few cases of bushwhacking on the 
western frontier, the intelligence that the president had 
reviewed suggested that there no longer remained a viable 
threat to Union forces in the state. As for those unfortunate 
cases in the west, Lincoln suggested that the cure might 
be “within easy reach of the people themselves.” Even 
this late in the war, Lincoln continued to put faith in what 
he described in his first inaugural as the “better angels” 
of man’s nature—that is, the ability of Americans to set 
aside their differences and uphold their “mystic chords 
of memory,” their common “bonds of affection.”19 This 
faith had led Lincoln to suggest to Fletcher that the time 
had come to hand over management of military affairs 
in Missouri to the militia. If allowed to assemble freely, 
the president believed, honest Missourians might express 
their common love of country and community and resolve 
to defend it against what Lincoln perceived to be a small 
band of fanatics that had, thus far, succeeded in dividing 
the community and terrorizing the countryside, but whose 
powers were obviously waning.20
 Fletcher completely disagreed. Responding to Lincoln 
on February 27, he suggested that, of all current theatres 
of war, the situation in Missouri was the worst. To prove 
his point, he gave the example of a village in western 
Missouri that was recently wracked by inhumane acts 
of butchery. For this unfortunate community, he wrote, 
the war in Missouri was truly a war of neighbor against 
neighbor. The survivors would most certainly reject the 
idea that they make “a covenant with the accessories of the 
slayers of their kindred.” Furthermore, he observed, recent 
events had proven that promises of peace were easily 
broken. Some rebels, having been paroled, had broken 
their vows to no longer take up arms by instead joining 
General Sterling Price’s raid through the southwest. Others 
had recently fled to the woods “to become banditti.” What 
was more, it was likely that these men would again be 
taking up arms when they learned that the convention in 
St. Louis sought to disfranchise them. No, Fletcher told 
the president, “we want no peace with rebels but the peace 
which comes of unconditional submission to the authority 
Thomas Fletcher (1827-1899) was the governor of Missouri 
in 1865 who issued the initial proclamation abolishing 
slavery. Fletcher was part of a number of key events 
during the Civil War. He was a delegate to the Republican 
National Convention in 1860, and supported Abraham 
Lincoln’s nomination. In the Union army he was at the fall 
of Vicksburg July 4, 1863, and commanded units at both 
William Sherman’s campaign against Atlanta and at Pilot 
Knob in Missouri where Gen. Sterling Price’s advances were 
stopped in 1864. (Image: Missouri State Archives)
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of the law.” And that authority could only be found in 
the justice meted out against civilian and soldier alike by 
military tribunals.21
 In the end, although he personally disagreed with them, 
Fletcher recognized the importance of a personal request 
from the President of the United States, and he decided 
to at least present Lincoln’s proposals to General Pope 
in order to obtain the commander’s opinion on whether 
or not to reinstate the power of the civilian courts. His 
letter to the general was later published, along with Pope’s 
lengthy reply, in the March 8 edition of the Missouri 
Republican. Surprisingly, Pope sided with the president. 
The recent elections of Lincoln and Fletcher, he believed, 
were sufficient evidence that the people of Missouri were 
“prepared to meet and settle any questions affecting the 
welfare and prosperity of the State.” It was therefore the 
job of state and federal forces to empower the citizens to 
now direct their own fate.22
 Pope’s letter was enough to convince Fletcher. On 
March 7, the same day that the Republican printed 
Pope’s response, the governor issued a proclamation 
reversing his earlier position on this issue. “There no 
longer exists within the state of Missouri,” Fletcher now 
admitted, “any organized force of the enemies of the 
Government of the United States.” Now acting upon 
Lincoln’s earlier suggestion, he invited all loyal citizens 
of the state to unite behind the civilian officials and “make 
common cause against whomever shall persist in making, 
aiding, or encouraging any description of lawlessness.” 
Finally, Fletcher added, military tribunals would no 
longer prosecute accused rebels within the state. Judges 
and justices of the peace would, instead, exercise that 
authority.23
 Bates heartily approved Fletcher’s decision to 
reestablish civil law, but his elation was short lived. 
Radicals in the convention immediately responded to the 
governor’s proclamation with a ringing condemnation. 
This denunciation of the governor’s proclamation, Bates 
wrote in his diary on March 9, “not only proves the 
ignorance and folly of the members of that body, but . . . 
also, to what destructive and wicked measures they resort 
for the sole purpose of consolidating and continuing their 
heartless and brainless party!”24 Still holding out hope that 
his assessment was premature, he bided his time, waiting 
to see what effect, if any, the radicals’ condemnation 
would have on state and federal forces. Again, events 
moved quickly.
 While Bates believed that Fletcher’s proclamation 
ordered the complete removal of martial law in Missouri, 
others certainly disagreed. In the March 9 edition of the 
Missouri Democrat, the editor argued that martial law 
was “still in force and will remain in force as long as there 
exists the least necessity for its exercise.” Additionally, 
on March 17 the editor warned his readers to avoid 
interpreting Pope’s response to Fletcher as encouraging 
immediate withdrawal of federal troops. Instead, the editor 
claimed to have learned directly from Pope himself that 
the commander intended only “to transform the military 
into a police force.” Civil courts would try criminals, 
he clarified, but if convicted, the military pronounce 
sentence on those criminals.25 As if to confirm the claims 
made by the Democrat, on March 20 Pope issued Special 
Orders No. 15, rescinding his earlier stance in his letter 
to Governor Fletcher and now declaring that the military, 
not the civil courts, would both apprehend and prosecute 
criminals. Far from reestablishing the sovereignty 
of the people, then, Pope’s order reversed Fletcher’s 
proclamation and established the superiority of military 
over civilian government.26 
 Issued by a commander who, mere weeks before, had 
professed his faith in the ability of the people to govern 
themselves, and following on the heels of the governor’s 
proclamation to that same effect, Bates judged Pope’s 
new order as wholly absurd. Moreover, he read sinister 
undertones in Pope’s about face. The commander’s 
recently shaken confidence in civil law, Bates concluded, 
was clearly the work of “the truculence of the 
Convention!”27 Bates had stayed his pen these past several 
General John Pope (1822-1892) served in Missouri and 
the Mississippi River theatre early in the Civil War, gaining 
sufficient distinction to be promoted to the army of the 
Potomac under George B. McClellan. After his defeat at 
the Second Battle of Bull Run, he spent the rest of the war 
in Minnesota. He returned to Missouri in early 1865 to 
command the Military Division of the Missouri. (Image: 
Library of Congress)
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months in order to coolly observe events. He had remained 
hopeful that Fletcher’s proclamation was a step in the 
right direction, but he was severely disheartened by Pope’s 
sudden abandonment of his earlier faith in Missourians’ 
ability to control their own destiny. For Bates, it was thus 
clear that the influence of the radicals knew no bounds. If 
they could infiltrate the highest levels of the military, they 
might do the same elsewhere in state government, and thus 
lead the state down a dangerous path. The time had come 
to intervene. On March 25, he sent a letter to the editor of 
the Democrat requesting space to publish several essays on 
current events. Then, having notified his closest associates 
of his intentions, he put his pen to paper.
 By April 3, Bates finished the first of six letters 
addressed to the people of Missouri. Printed in both the 
Missouri Democrat and the Missouri Republican, he 
initially sought to dispel any possible accusations of his 
own disloyalty in speaking out against the convention. “All 
that I am,” he affirmed, “and all that I have is inseparably 
connected with the interests and character of the State.” 
That said, he believed it his duty to educate the people of 
“the danger and utter ruin which now hangs [over them].” 
Blaming his age and health for not being more physically 
active in opposing these events, he nonetheless reminded 
his readers that he had only lately been very active in the 
Lincoln Administration, where all of his strength was 
employed toward preserving the Union.28
 Although the nation was preserved, Bates stated that a 
new crisis had emerged—civil rights in Missouri were in 
jeopardy. Bates recalled how he had returned to St. Louis 
to find civil law “trodden down.” To that end, despite 
the radicals’ arguments to the contrary, he urged that 
martial law be immediately ended throughout the state. 
Additionally, he contended, the very idea that martial law 
successfully suppressed violence by bushwhackers was 
really a radical ploy to mislead the public and weaken 
civil authority. To further clarify this fact, he revisited 
the claims made by the Democrat that General Pope’s 
letter and Governor Fletcher’s proclamation did not 
immediately suspend martial law. On the contrary, Bates 
wrote. Pope had admitted in his original letter to Fletcher 
that the rebel threat equated to perhaps twenty people per 
county. Suggesting Pope’s original letter displayed the 
general’s true feelings, Bates concluded that Pope’s later 
about face was the result of pressure from radical factions. 
Furthermore, he wrote, the Democrat’s argument for 
continuing martial law should be read merely as a nervous 
and deceitful clique attempting to maintain its own 
authority.29
 In his second letter, published ten days later, Bates 
turned his attention to the subject of martial law as it 
related to the convention. It was a subject on which he 
had fairly extensive experience. In the opening days of the 
war, President Lincoln had felt compelled by the national 
crisis to assume a broad range of powers previously 
granted by the constitution to other branches of the 
federal government. In no case was this truer than in the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the subsequent 
use of martial law by military commanders as a means of 
quelling the rebellion. After the Maryland legislature flirted 
with the idea of secession (which would have surrounded 
Washington, D.C., with rebel territory), on April 27, 1861, 
Lincoln took drastic measures and suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus along a declared military line extending 
from Washington to Philadelphia. General Winfield Scott 
was then directed to arrest any person deemed dangerous 
to the Union war effort within that region. Later, on 
May 10, the president extended the suspension to the 
entire state of Florida and, eventually, suspended the writ 
nationwide. Naturally, this action did not go unnoticed by 
conservatives. Chief Justice Roger Taney, a holdover from 
the Jacksonian era, responded with a caustic criticism of 
Lincoln’s supposed abuse of power, and he claimed that 
the Constitution strictly reserved to the legislative branch 
alone the power to suspend habeas corpus.30 
 As attorney general, it was Bates’ responsibility to make 
the legal case for his chief’s actions. Doing so, however, 
put him in a difficult situation. As a Whig, he had detested 
the expansion of executive authority. Now he was put to 
the task of sanctioning such actions. Asked to write an 
official response to Taney’s opinion, he examined both 
Article I of the Constitution as well the Judiciary Act of 
1789, which had first granted to Congress the power to 
suspend the writ. Since the constitution had created the 
Congress, Bates argued, the power to suspend the writ was 
embodied in the former, and not bestowed upon the latter. 
The act, which gave Congress its power, could be repealed 
at any time, while the power itself remained. Beyond 
that, if the branches of the federal government enjoyed 
separate but equal status under the constitution, then by the 
understanding that the legislature—a political body—was 
given the power to suspend the writ, it followed that the 
executive branch—by its status as the only other political 
branch of the government—might be understood as having 
the same power. It was a slippery argument, to be sure, but 
it meant that the authority to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus could essentially be assumed by any branch of the 
government during a time of crisis. 
 As to the president’s ability to invoke martial law, Bates 
focused on the president’s dual responsibility as both 
civil magistrate and military chief. Their specific oaths of 
office separated the executive and legislative branches in 
ways that Taney could not possibly have unintentionally 
overlooked. Congressmen and senators swore an oath to 
“support the Constitution,” but the president swore an 
oath to “preserve, protect and defend” it. The former oath 
was passive in nature while the second was assertive. 
Furthermore, observed Bates, the Insurrection Act of 1807 
had granted the president the ability to fulfill his oath and 
suppress insurrection through the use of martial law. Thus, 
the president was given certain powers for the express 
purpose of defending the nation against all enemies. By 
directing his military commanders to invoke martial law, 
Bates concluded, Lincoln had acted within the limits of his 
constitutional authority as commander-in-chief.31
 Drafting an opinion that interpreted executive power 
so broadly was no easy feat for the conservative Whig. 
His lifelong philosophy was naturally contradictory to 
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such broad interpretation. Still, the drastic state of affairs 
seemed to have compelled him to temporarily discard 
his reservations for the sake of national security. Now, 
four years later, Bates was not so willing to discard his 
personal opinions—especially when he saw the radicals 
in the Missouri state convention using martial law not for 
the purposes of protecting the people against an enemy, 
but rather as a means of shoring up their political power in 
the state. “There are some members of [the convention],” 
he asserted, “who ought to know and do know that 
martial law [as opposed to civil law] is simply no law at 
all.” Unable to find a description of martial law in any 
statute book he owned, Bates concluded that the term 
was merely “a nickname for arbitrary power, assumed 
against law.” Furthermore, the danger in this policy, as 
he saw it, lay in the opportunity it provided for a military 
commander to become a Cromwell or a Bonaparte, and 
thereby assert his authority over both the people and their 
elected representatives. To prevent such an event, Bates 
believed, it was crucial that the people understand that 
“the military is subordinate to the civil power, and can act 
only as the minister and servant of the law.” Given the 
influence that the convention already exhibited over state 
and local authorities, it was true that, were the convention 
to continue to enforce martial law, it would be operating 
“without any fear of punishment [from a higher authority] 
for [its] misdeeds.” Nonetheless, if a dictator were 
somehow to assume power through the prolonged use of 
martial law, then the convention and the people might just 
become victims of the very monster they had created.32
 On April 10, three days before the publication of Bates’ 
second letter but too late for him to amend its contents, 
the convention passed the new state constitution. The 
following day the local papers immediately published the 
text and announced that a vote on ratification was set for 
June 6. This was more than enough time for supporters 
of the document to educate the public on its provisions. 
“Let it have a free and fair discussion before the people,” 
exclaimed the Democrat, “and this so far as in us lies it 
shall have—and there is no doubt about its triumphant 
The Loyalty Oath, like this one, was central to the political conflict in the aftermath of the Civil War, as Radical Republicans 
sought to keep Confederate sympathizers from having influence in the new government. (Image: Missouri State Archives)
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adoption.” However, Charles Drake—curiously—did 
not share the Democrat’s optimism. In the wake of the 
growing conservative criticism, he warned in a letter 
published in the Democrat, radicals should prepare to 
vigorously defend the constitution as the best means 
of securing the supremacy of loyalty within the state. 
“Disloyalty in Missouri is in the last ditch,” Drake wrote, 
“and will die hard” only if ratification were successful. 
“Look forward, then, in the next fifty nine days, to the 
severest struggle we have yet had to make.”33 
 Aside from the role that martial law played in its 
conception, the conservatives’ other primary criticism of 
the constitution was over both an article of that document 
that disfranchised former rebels, and an ordinance 
empowering the governor to remove from office any 
person whom he personally deemed disloyal. They also 
argued that the constitution’s very creation was extralegal, 
since a new document was not one of the proposals voted 
on by the populace in the 1864 referendum that called the 
convention into session.
 Article II, Section 3 of the document expressly forbade 
the right to vote to any persons who had participated in 
or aided rebellion against the United States. Examples 
of disloyalty were numerous—from sheltering or 
sympathizing with rebel troops, to holding office in the 
Confederate government, to communicating with or 
assisting bushwhackers in the west. However, the measure 
also provided numerous less-clear examples, including 
taking up arms against the state, which many persons 
loyal to the Union had done when they opposed the pro-
secession administration of Claiborne Fox Jackson in 
1861. Any person who had performed one of these acts 
was barred under the article from serving in government 
office, holding a position as a trustee, director or manager 
of any corporation, or from serving in positions such as 
educators, lawyers, members of school boards, or even as 
clergymen. In order to regulate the measure, Sections 4 
and 5 of the article authorized the legislature to generate 
lists of qualified and unqualified voters. And finally, 
franchise rights would be barred from anyone who did not 
first take an oath of loyalty.34
 Hand-in-hand with the disfranchisement clause, the 
convention passed a measure known as the “ousting 
ordinance.” Passed on March 17, it ordered the offices of 
all court judges (including the state Supreme Court), court 
clerks, circuit attorneys and their assistants, and sheriffs 
and county recorders vacated by May 1. The governor was 
then authorized to appoint seat holders who had professed 
their allegiance to the state and national governments 
through the loyalty oath. The new officers would then be 
elected starting in 1866.35
 Like the Federalist campaign of 1787-1788, Drake 
intended to use the next few months to explain to 
Missourians the constitution’s most controversial sections. 
To that end, he published the first of several letters in its 
defense on the same day as the document’s public debut. 
In doing so, Drake accurately predicted the intensity of 
the conservative opposition. While Drake intended to be 
the leading voice among the constitution’s supporters, 
Bates’ first two letters had made him a logical choice to 
lead the opposition. Bates had originally planned only to 
criticize the radicals’ use of martial law, believing that its 
removal would rob the radicals of their best ability to out-
voice conservatives and result in the creation of a far more 
moderate constitution. However, sudden publication of the 
constitution in early April thrust Bates into a new role as 
leader of both the conservative Republicans and the loyal 
Democrats. The publication of his next series of essays, 
then, had the potential to provide a foundation for building 
an opposition platform.36
 While conservatives did not argue that the 
disfranchisement clause was extralegal (the convention 
was, after all, called for the express purposes of both 
eradicating slavery and securing franchise rights for 
loyal citizens), they did express dissatisfaction with the 
wording of the article. Publishing an essay in the local 
newspapers on April 18, the conservative members of 
the convention—led by Dr. Moses Linton—publicly 
expressed their concern. The examples of disloyalty listed 
in the article, they explained, were so broad that “no 
conscientious man can take [the loyalty oath], however 
loyal he now is, if in the beginning of our troubles, he has 
even said a word or done an act countenancing secession, 
or even sympathizing with a secessionist in any degree.”37
 Bates naturally supported Dr. Linton and his colleagues, 
and his third letter, published on April 29, briefly touched 
upon their concerns. Bates agreed that the examples of 
disloyalty were too ambiguous to properly differentiate 
between a loyal and a disloyal person. Furthermore, he 
considered the forced removal of government personnel 
whom the constitution deemed “disloyal” as further 
evidence of a radical scheme to place their colleagues 
in positions of power otherwise unobtainable by them 
through lawful means. The radical standard of loyalty, he 
wrote, was simple to understand: “no man can be loyal 
who is not a Radical.” However, true loyalty, he avowed, 
was defined as allegiance to the rule of law, “not a blind 
devotion to a clique or faction.”38
 Expanding on his argument against the ousting 
ordinance, Bates used it to show that the convention, by 
the means of its creation, was a revolutionary assembly. 
In his fourth letter, published on May 11, he reminded 
his readers that the original 1864 referendum was a call 
for the constitution’s amendment, not its nullification. 
Since both emancipation and disfranchisement were 
accomplished through ordinance, instead of amendment, 
in Bates’s opinion, the convention was guilty of fostering a 
revolution. Furthermore, the ousting ordinance proved that 
the radicals had convinced General Pope to sustain martial 
law with the intent of using it to quell any opposition by 
the legally elected government officials. These acts, he 
concluded, proved that the radicals were employing “a new 
and extraordinary power, not belonging to any department 
of the state government nor to all of them combined.” 
The “radical revolution,” then, began when the original 
constitution was discarded, and it was completed by the 
forced removal of anyone who stood in the convention’s 
way.39
Fall/Winter 2013 | The Confluence | 15
 Drake did not sit idly by while Bates sullied the 
reputation of the convention. Instead, he directly 
responded to Bates’ accusations with all the cunning of 
an experienced politician. In his response to Linton’s 
charges against the disfranchisement clause, he highlighted 
Linton’s Catholic faith in his explanation of the importance 
of the clause. Catholics, Drake argued, believed in the 
Sacrament of Reconciliation (in which a person expressed 
repentance for sins and followed through with physical 
acts of penance). Also, he noted, Catholics believed in 
the existence of Purgatory (a sort of limbo where souls 
remained in penance for a period of time before entering 
Heaven). It was curious, then, that Linton opposed the 
disfranchisement clause, since doing so contradicted both 
of those doctrines. How, Drake asked, could a person 
who believed in the connection between repentance and 
penance, when it applied to religion, not also see the 
wisdom in disfranchising rebels for a period of time after 
they had recanted through the loyalty oath? Were not the 
principles applied to the Sacrament and those applied 
to disloyalty the same? Loyal citizens, he concluded, 
subscribed to the principle “once a traitor, always a 
traitor.” For them, the disfranchise clause effectively 
addressed this concern.40
 Drake also addressed Bates’ assertion that the 
convention was part of a scheme to consolidate radical 
power in the state. It was true, Drake conceded, that 
the convention had acted in error when it accomplished 
emancipation and disfranchisement through ordinance, 
rather than amendment. However, he absolved himself of 
any blame by explaining that the convention had passed 
these measures during a time when he was personally 
absent due to illness. The damage done and the ordinances 
now considered the law of the land, the only way to 
correct the mistake was to nullify the current operating 
constitution and replace it with this new document. This 
rationalization, Drake hoped, would effectively convince 
Missourians that the 1865 constitution, in actuality, 
was created through legal means and with the best of 
intentions. At worst, declaring his innocence in the 
convention’s errors might acquit him of any wrongdoing.41
 Despite his best efforts, Drake failed to garner much 
support against conservative critics. In fact, several of the 
radicals who had earlier supported the convention now 
turned against it. In a letter published in the Democrat, 
Governor Fletcher himself expressed concern that the 
rigidity of the constitution’s terms would inhibit the 
ability of future generations to amend it. Considering this 
flaw, Fletcher wrote, he would personally vote against 
ratification in June. After reading this announcement, 
Bates observed gleefully, “‘the rats are running from the 
burning house.’ Governor Fletcher [has] waked up, from 
the drunken dream of radicalism, just in time to smell the 
smoke of the kindling fires, and save [himself], by timely 
flight, from the coming conflagration.”42
 In the final days before the vote, Bates managed to 
publish two more letters. For the most part, they recapped 
his argument against martial law and continued to press 
upon the convention’s revolutionary conception. He also 
took this occasion to express his hope that the people 
would choose wisely in the coming referendum. The 
state constitution, he avowed, was not the property of the 
legislators or the lawyers, but of the people. Having begun 
his crusade to champion civilian rule, he concluded by 
promising, “I will continue to make the best defense I can 
of the only valuable inheritance left to us by our fathers—
liberty according to law.”43
 After publishing six letters against the convention, Bates 
earned the title of leader of the conservative opposition. 
Yet his efforts received mixed reviews. For instance, one 
writer to the Democrat called him a feeble old man—his 
apparent ravings against the radicals being attributed to 
“the influence and promptings of accumulating years 
which strengthen prejudices as they weaken the reason.” 
Another equated him with the former rebels, declaring him 
the leader of all enemies of the truly loyal populace. Yet 
another defended Bates, describing him “as honorable and 
pure a man and patriot as lives in Missouri,” and urging 
its readers to “swear and vote . . . though it is evident [the 
reader] would do wisely to vote no.”44
 For the most part, however, the citizenry of Missouri 
appeared to support the conservatives. And this fact was 
not lost on the radicals. St. Louis citizen Louis Fusz, 
for instance, noted in his diary a number of rumors that 
in some regions of the state where radicals held a large 
majority, conservative citizens were being denied the right 
to vote, regardless of whether or not they had previously 
taken the loyalty oath. As well, Fusz noted, just as he had 
done after receiving Pope’s letter against martial law, 
Governor Fletcher had once again reversed his opinion 
against ratification and now embraced the power of the 
ousting ordinance. Fusz, for one, never doubted that 
radical pressure had influenced Fletcher’s reversal. The 
election judges who barred conservatives from voting, 
after all, were placed in their positions by the ousting 
ordinance.45
 Despite cases of voter fraud, early indications predicted 
that the conservatives would ultimately be victorious. 
Bates and Fusz both noted in their diaries that the vote 
in St. Louis County, for instance, was overwhelmingly 
against the constitution. “We have carried St. Louis and 
St. Charles,” Bates declared, “and to all appearance, the 
nuisance will be abated.” Drake, he noted, “is plucked 
bare, and cast down upon his own dunghill, “ and “all 
the prominent members of the Convention are sunk into 
contempt and the whole party in this state, I think has 
received its death blow.”46
 Although victory seemed imminent, the actual results 
took weeks to tally. On July 1, Missouri secretary of 
state Francis Rodman certified the results as 43,670 votes 
in favor, 41,808 against. By a narrow 51 percent, the 
referendum passed. That same day, Governor Fletcher 
proclaimed the constitution in effect as of July 4.47 For 
Bates, the result was bittersweet. On the one hand, his 
cause was ultimately lost. On the other hand, conservatives 
had managed to carry St. Louis. Furthermore, the civilian 
population had voted down the constitution by a narrow 
majority of 965 votes. Only by allowing soldiers still 
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in the field to cast absentee ballots and by empowering 
partisan judges to reject votes in opposition had the 
radicals managed to secure a victory. Ultimately, Bates 
marked his disappointment with silence. He chose not to 
expound upon it in his diary—a characteristic he often 
displayed whenever he failed to impact the implementation 
of a policy he felt passionate about (he had acted 
similarly during the debate and implantation of Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation in 1862-63).48
 In the months following the vote, Bates slipped back 
into obscurity. The ratification of the constitution along 
with the radicals’ strong majority in the state legislature 
convinced him that his conservative Whig values were 
formally out of favor in both state and national politics. 
Nevertheless, small groups of the opposition continued 
to advocate the conservative cause. On July 19, for 
instance, St. Louis Archbishop Peter R. Kenrick ordered 
his priests to refuse to take the loyalty oath. If Roman 
Catholics opposed the constitution, Bates hoped, perhaps 
other “weaker sects” such as teachers and lawyers would 
follow the Church’s example. Bates’ own fighting spirit, 
however, had been severely taxed by his battle with the 
radicals. As had occurred during his tenure as attorney 
general, his efforts sapped much of his strength. On the 
same day that he noted Bishop Kenrick’s opposition, he 
also recorded that his health had become “feeble.” Less 
than a week later, his breathing was increasingly labored, 
prompting his family to send for a doctor. The pain in his 
chest was almost unbearable. Fearing the worst, Bates left 
parting words for his family. But, by slow degrees, his 
health rallied—although he was confined to bed for several 
days.49
 On September 4, just over a month later, he celebrated 
his seventy-second birthday. On this occasion, he noted, 
“there remain now, of the 12 children brought up by my 
parents, only two of us—my sister Margaret M. Wharton 
. . . now 80 years, and myself.” If his recent political 
defeat had not done so already, his age and health became 
constant reminders that he was a member of a generation 
slowly disappearing from the earth. Furthermore, his 
daughter noted during his last illness that her father had 
found peace with God and was prepared to leave the world 
in the hands of a younger generation. The death of his 
sister on December 11, coinciding with a relapse of his 
breathing malady, must only have strengthened his belief 
in his own imminent departure from life.50
 Political events only further reminded Bates of his 
frailty. No longer could he affect the course of events. On 
October 26 a conservative convention met in St. Louis to 
solidify opposition to the radical majority in the assembly, 
but in light of their defeats over the past year, Bates was 
less than enthusiastic about their ability to halt the radical 
advance. Although the civilian vote had sided with the 
opposition in the late referendum, his faith in their success 
through “harmony and unity of purpose” was badly 
shaken. Still, while Bates no longer led the opposition, 
he did make an attempt to aid them by writing an article 
in support of Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown’s call for 
universal suffrage of all Missourians. Without proper 
guidance, though, it appeared that conservatives lacked 
strong enough leadership to make any headway.
 Instead, on November 25 several radicals called for the 
universal disfranchisement of all disloyal citizens. The 
constitution had, until this time, merely disfranchised 
them for a period of time before re-administering their 
rights. This new measure, Bates believed, confirmed 
what he had long believed—that the very men who had 
given birth to the new constitution now saw fit to treat it 
“not as the Organic law of the State, but a contrivance to 
consolidate the strength and continue the supremacy of 
the present dominant faction.” These new measures, he 
lamented, were a final testament to the fact that “Ours is 
no longer a Government of the People—a democracy—but 
an aristocracy of the good people, the loyal people, the 
Radicals!”51
 Throughout the first half of 1865, believing that 
Missourians might not otherwise be aware of the 
disregard for their individual liberties, Bates pursued 
a pedagogical campaign to inform the citizenry of the 
extralegal measures of the convention. While it had 
begun as a criticism against the use of martial law, it 
eventually blossomed into a full discourse against the 
suppression of civil rights and minority representation. 
In taking up this fight, he did only what he had done 
throughout his entire public career, playing the role of the 
people’s advocate. As attorney general, desperate times 
had forced him to endorse desperate measures, such as 
military arrest of civilians in order to preserve the Union. 
With the war won, however, Bates believed that civil law 
must be reinstated. When this did not occur, he resolved 
that another battle must be fought to reinstate republican 
government. Deciding to fight this battle, he had done all 
in his power to rally conservatives to his cause, and in 
this, he succeeded. But the citizen vote had been narrowly 
defeated. The radicals were victorious in sustaining their 
measures, and they continued to strengthen their power—
both in Missouri as well as nationwide—over the course of 
the next few years.
 Drake himself personally rode the wave of radical 
popularity. In 1867, having worked tirelessly to support 
their faction which was now squarely in control of the state 
assembly, the radicals elected him to the United States 
Senate. However, Drake’s popularity lasted for only a short 
while. As with the rest of the nation, as business prospects 
between former rebels and Union men in Missouri began 
to overshadow other issues directly associated with the late 
war (such as enfranchisement of blacks), the radical cause 
declined. The first check on Drake’s influence within the 
state came in 1869 when Carl Schurz challenged Benjamin 
F. Loan of St. Joseph for election to the U.S. Senate. Drake 
correctly saw this campaign as an attempt to divide the 
loyalties of the Republican Party, and he subsequently 
traveled to Jefferson City to directly confront Schurz in a 
Republican caucus. Schurz, however, masterfully handled 
Drake—forcing the radical Senator to lose his temper 
and launch an ethnic tirade against Germans (a sizable 
voting bloc in both the state and in the assembly). Leaving 
Jefferson City shortly after this confrontation, Drake was 
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not present to witness Schurz’s victory. Subsequently, the 
next November, the radical faction suffered heavily at the 
polls. And although President Ulysses S. Grant nominated 
Drake as chief justice of the court of claims—a position 
that Drake held until his retirement in 1885—his fall from 
political prominence had been nothing short of meteoric.52 
 Unfortunately, Bates did not survive to see the eventual 
humiliation of his radical adversary. In the months 
following the ratification of the constitution of 1865, Bates 
grew more estranged from those in power, including some 
of his own friends. He recorded on December 24, 1865, 
that his health had once again deteriorated and, in light of 
the fact that visits from his friends had tapered off over 
the preceding months, he feared himself “forgotten like a 
dead man.” By the last days of 1865, then, he could look 
back upon the failures and disappointments of the past 
year and conclude, “Old men like me, sick, it may be, and 
uninteresting, ought not be surprised that the young do 
not affect their society.”53 Politics, it seemed, had moved 
beyond the need for men like Edward Bates.
 Instead of going extinct, however, the conservative 
values by which Bates had so staunchly abided all his life 
actually saw resurgence during the early 1870s in response 
to the federal policies of Reconstruction. Beginning in 
1866 the movement—ultimately known as the Liberal 
Republican movement—rooted itself prominently in the 
agenda of Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown. The factional 
strife within Missouri led conservative Republicans, so 
recently cast from power by the radicals, to call for a new 
policy of universal amnesty and enfranchisement for all 
citizens (whether or not they had been former rebels) 
whose rights were subjugated by workings of the late 
constitutional convention. This movement was not fully 
organized, however, until 1871 when Missouri became the 
springboard for launching a national movement to take 
back the party. In the previous year the Liberals officially 
broke from the state party and submitted their own ticket 
in the state elections; the result was the successful election 
of Brown as governor of Missouri. By 1872, a national 
conservative movement was under way in both North and 
South that ultimately nominated Brown as vice president 
on a ticket with former New York Tribune editor Horace 
Greeley.54
 Likewise, this conservative resurgence was ultimately 
successful in 1875 in overhauling the Missouri 
constitution. Finally eliminated from that document were 
the draconian clauses that Bates had fought against so 
vociferously. Instead, the document specifically defended 
the principle of states’ rights (but not at the expense of 
the Union), the securing of natural rights for all citizens, 
and the calling for free and open elections. Particularly 
important, the constitution defined treason against the 
state as waging war against the state, but it noted that 
a person could only be convicted of such a crime upon 
the testimony of two or more witnesses and in a court 
of law. Furthermore, all restrictions placed upon office 
holders and private occupations were omitted along with 
the disenfranchisement clauses of the earlier document. 
No longer would a political faction exercise the power to 
declare traitors and patriots. No longer would that faction 
likewise control both public and private offices.55
 Had Bates lived long enough, it is likely that he would 
have endorsed the Liberal Republicans. Furthermore, if 
his health had permitted, he might even have partaken 
in the public support of liberal candidates. However, 
by December 1868, on the eve of this new wave of 
conservatism, his was once again wracked by old 
afflictions in both his lungs and throat, and his health 
steadily worsened through the New Year. By March 
1869, doctors informed his family that this would likely 
be Bates’s final illness. Surrounded by his friends and 
relatives, Edward Bates died on March 25, 1869. He was 
76 years old.56
 In the days following his death, individuals and 
organizations that had previously been estranged from 
Bates’ acquaintance by his comments against ratification 
of the Missouri constitution openly mourned the loss by 
the city, state, and nation of this public servant. “Such men 
as Edward Bates have seldom lived,” eulogized James O. 
Broadhead at a meeting of the St. Louis Bar Association 
just days after Bates’ death, “and therefore it is that we are 
seldom called to mourn the death of such.” Throughout 
Bates’ long life, Broadhead noted, the late statesman had 
always remained a true, upright, charitable, and kind-
hearted man. “He had a wonderful equipoise of character, 
not so much the result of education as of native instinct.” 
Also, though Broadhead recalled that Bates was not above 
personal difficulties and controversies, he was separated 
from lesser men by his ability to meet adversity without 
compromising his own personal integrity. “With all his 
gentle nature,” Broadhead concluded, “he was without 
exception, the bravest man I ever knew.”57
 Samuel T. Glover likewise mourned Bates’ passing. 
Bates, Glover eulogized, was most remembered as having 
never compromised his own integrity. “Few men,” Glover 
wrote, “have passed through the turmoil of active public 
and private life for fifty years and left a name that may so 
well defy even the tongues of malice.” Though agreeing 
with Broadhead that Bates’ moral character would be 
long remembered in the hearts of his contemporaries, 
Glover believed it was Bates’s strong defense of the U.S. 
Constitution that would be of lasting significance. “Would 
to God,” Glover prayed, “that among our leading and 
most influential citizens that have taken ‘oaths’ to support 
the Constitution there were found a greater number 
who employed the care that he did to comprehend its 
meaning.”58
 Believing that Bates represented a moral fiber and 
character that would be forever lacking in subsequent 
generations, Glover recalled the words of a friend who 
walked with him in the procession that accompanied 
Bates to his final resting place in Bellefontaine Cemetery. 
“A friend observed,” Glover concluded, “that Mr. Bates 
belonged to a generation that had passed away. . . . I have 
pondered upon these words. They conveyed to my mind 
more than their literal import.” It should be the business of 
all good citizens, Glover therefore proposed, to venerate 
Bates’ name and merits for all time.
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